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INTRODUCTION
As more and more transnational agreements are formed, the
need for dependable, impartial dispute resolution has never been
greater. This need will only increase as the global economy becomes
more integrated and improved communication technology lessens the
importance of face-to-face dealings between commercial parties. If a
party does not reflect carefully on what might go wrong with a trans-
national agreement and the cost of settling disputes, the heavy burden
of litigating in unfamiliar territory has the potential to outweigh the
prospective benefits of contracting with foreign parties. Parties of
equal bargaining power that enter into transnational agreements are
understandably loath to submit their disputes to the public courts of
one party's home jurisdiction out of fear of, inter alia, bias, unfamiliar
procedure, and the public disclosure of court proceedings. Arbitra-
tion, in theory at least, offers a neutral decision-making structure that
preserves confidentiality and allows parties to choose the procedure to
be followed and seek enforcement of arbitral awards worldwide.
Often, when negotiating agreements, overly optimistic parties do
not dedicate sufficient time to thinking about how to settle disputes,
should they arise. Such discussion usually takes place after the sub-
stantive details of a contract have been hammered out. If the interac-
tion between parties has been contentious, they may not think it
worth their time to discuss a deviation from a standard arbitration
clause or submission tojurisdiction. On the other hand, if discussions
have been friendly or in the context of an ongoing business relation-
ship, parties may think that insisting upon specific provisions related
to contract breakdown would show a lack of confidence that could
damage the parties' relationship. Another consideration is that par-
ties may simply be worried about the additional legal fees that they
will incur if they negotiate details regarding potential disputes. For
these reasons, parties choosing to submit their disputes to arbitration
often do not construct their arbitration agreements in a careful man-
ner. When disputes do arise, this lack of planning can lead to pro-
tracted legal battles that drag parties through not only arbitration but
also public litigation in multiple forums, precisely the result that the
parties were seeking to avoid by agreeing to arbitrate.
A party with savvy counsel sensitive to the current norms of arbi-
tration across multiple jurisdictions will know the value of putting
forth the effort necessary to craft an arbitration agreement that will, to
the greatest degree possible, keep potential future disputes out of
courts and in arbitration. The global standardization of the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, largely due to the
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New York Convention,' provides a common starting point to under-
stand how to go about forming an effective arbitration agreement.
Nevertheless, due to the varied nature of countries' substantive and
arbitration laws, parties must carefully consider their choices of gov-
erning substantive law, the law governing their arbitration agreement,
and the seat of arbitration.
Parties' choice of a seat of arbitration 2 has especially important
ramifications with respect to the law to be applied to disputes that may
arise. As reflected in the New York Convention,3 the jurisdiction in
which the seat of arbitration lies determines the lex arbitri to be ap-
plied, meaning that it is that jurisdiction's courts that will determine
the existence, validity, and scope of the parties' arbitration agree-
ment. Thus, the choice of a seat of arbitration, in addition to the
choice of substantive law and the law to be applied to the arbitration
agreement, will determine the tools available to a party to enforce an
arbitration agreement and the costs associated with dispute
resolution.
An antisuit injunction to enforce an arbitration agreement is one
such tool that has been the subject of intense debate both between
civil- and common-law jurisdictions and among circuit courts of the
United States. When used to enforce an arbitration agreement, this
type of injunction usually arises under the following scenario: Parties
A and B enter into a contract that includes an agreement to settle any
disputes in arbitration to be held in Country 1, which is often a neu-
tral country. Party B, either ignoring the arbitration agreement or
contesting its existence, validity, or scope, brings or threatens to bring
a parallel proceeding in Country 2, which is likely to be Party B's
home jurisdiction. In response, Party A petitions a court of Country 1
to enjoin Party B from continuing with its action in Country 2 on the
basis of their arbitration agreement. Country l's court may issue an
antisuit injunction against Party B, meaning that it will hold Party B in
contempt if it continues its Country 2 action. If Party B ignores the
1 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Conven-
tion]. As of November 27, 2009, there were 144 countries party to the Convention. United
Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Status: 1958 - Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_
texts/arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2009).
2 "Seat" of arbitration should not be taken literally; it is possible for non-U.S. parties
to choose New York as their "seat" of arbitration and have non-U.S. attorneys represent
them in arbitral proceedings outside the United States. Thus, the choice of a "seat" can be
more simply understood as a choice of lex arbitri.
3 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1) (e).
2010]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
injunction, it puts any assets or future business prospects that it may
have in Country 1 at risk.4
It is important to note from the outset that an antisuit injunction
is not, strictly speaking, addressed to a foreign court; hence, it is not a
direct interference with that court's jurisdiction. The effect of an anti-
suit injunction to enforce an arbitration agreement is to encourage
the party that brings a parallel action in violation of the arbitration
agreement to submit to arbitration and to save the party seeking the
injunction the costs of litigating that parallel action. An enjoined
party may, at the risk of exposing itself to sanctions in the enjoining
court's country, initiate a parallel proceeding in a foreign court. In
practice, of course, this is a technical difference that does not quell
the outcries of unjustifiable usurpation that courts ofjurisdictions op-
posed to antisuit injunctions express. Even U.S. courts have recog-
nized that antisuit injunctions "effectively restrict[ ] the jurisdiction of
the court of a foreign sovereign. '5
An examination of a case that the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) recently decided, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc.,6 better known
simply as West Tankers, brings to the fore the fundamentally opposed
views that civil- and common-law jurisdictions hold of antisuit injunc-
tions in the context of international commercial arbitration. In Feb-
ruary 2007, the United Kingdom's House of Lords referred to the ECJ
the question of whether antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration
agreements were compatible with the Brussels Regulation. 7 In Sep-
tember 2008, the Advocate General of the ECJ recommended that the
court answer this question in the negative.8 In February 2009, the ECJ
4 The focus of this Note is the issuance of antisuit injunctions by courts as opposed to
arbitral tribunals. Arbitral tribunals, depending on the power that parties choose to grant
them, may issue antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration agreements and prevent parallel
proceedings. See generally Laurent Levy, Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators, in INT'L
ARBITRATION INST., ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 115, 115-28
(Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005) (providing a brief overview of arbitrators' power to issue
antisuit injunctions). Parties may, however, encounter difficulties in attempting to enforce
antisuit injunctions issued by arbitral tribunals. See id. at 128-29 ("[A]rbitrators should
always exercise utmost care before issuing anti-suit injunctions, as the effect of these anti-
suit injunctions may be more harmful than the problem they are seeking to resolve. This
will be the case, in particular, if the measure ordered prevents a party from exercising
legitimate rights or if it leads to the annulment of the award on the ground that the arbi-
tral tribunal has been the judge in its own cause and, hence, lacked impartiality.").
5 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citing United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1038 (2d Cir. 1985)).
6 Case C-185/07, 2009 E.C.R. __, 2009 WIL 303723.
7 Council Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1
(EC) [hereinafter Brussels Regulation]; West Tankers Inc. v. Ras Riunione Adriatica di
Sicurta SpA (The "Front Comor"), [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, [25].
8 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott, Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers
Inc., 2009 E.C.R. -, 2008 WL 4089512, para. 74.
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followed the Advocate General's recommendation, putting an end to
this common practice of English courts, at least with respect to other
member states of the European Union.9 The ECJ's decision in West
Tankers is consistent with the civilian view of antisuit injunctions as
interference by one state's courts with the jurisdiction of another's
and thus offensive to international comity.10
Looking to the other side of the Atlantic, the consensus is clear:
antisuit injunctions are among the tools that a party may use to en-
force an arbitration agreement."1 This is the typical common-law out-
look that the House of Lords fruitlessly espoused in West Tankers.12 A
divergence among U.S. courts, however, lies in the weight that courts
should give to the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments. ' 13 The circuit courts have enumerated two relatively clear but
different standards to determine generally when a party may be en-
joined from pursuing a parallel proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction. 14
However, neither camp of circuit courts has pronounced a standard
specifically tailored to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Every country containing a significant financial center has an in-
terest in providing incentives for parties to seat arbitration within its
borders and apply its law. The availability of antisuit injunctions to
9 West Tankers, 2009 E.C.R. _, 2009 "AIL 303723, para. 34.
10 SeeJohn J. Barcel6 III, Anti-Foreign-Suit Injunctions to Enforce Arbitration Agreements, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PA-
PERS 2007, at 107, 107 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008) ("[C]ivil law jurisdictions generally
find anti-foreign-suit injunctions offensive, even violative of international law."). Since the
founding of the ECJ, when inconsistencies between civil- and common-law practice have
given rise to disputes between EU member states, the court has tended to adopt the former
as "European law":
The ECJ is not only bound by the very civilian wording, internal coherence
and objectives of the Brussels I instrument but also by the intentions of its
civilian drafters; in addition the ECJ has shown that it unfortunately tends
to adopt a "civil law based approach" and be theory driven rather than prac-
tice driven, and while its position is often informed by comparative law, it
essentially relies on the position of the majority and of course the vast ma-
jority of EU Member States are civilian.
Aude Fiorini, The Codification of Private International Law in Europe-Could the Community
Learn from the Experience of Mixed Jurisdictions?, 23 TUL. EUR. & Clv. L.F. 89, 107 (2008)
(footnotes omitted).
S1I See Daniel Tan, Enforcing International Arbitration Agreements in Federal Courts: Rethink-
ing the Court's Remedial Powers, 47 VA.J. INT'L L. 545, 561 (2007) ("Antisuit injunctions...
are fast becoming the principal non-statutory remedy to vindicate breaches of arbitration
agreements.").
12 West Tankers, [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, [16].
13 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
14 The so-called "conservative" or "restrictive" standard has been adopted by the D.C.,
Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits. The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have adopted a
"liberal" approach. Antisuit injunctions outside the context of enforcement of arbitration
agreements are not within the purview of this Note. For a helpful general overview of this
circuit split, see Steven R. Swanson, Antisuit Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration,
81 TUL. L. REv. 395, 412-15 (2006).
2010]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
enforce arbitration agreements is one factor that may influence par-
ties choosing a seat and the law that shall govern their arbitration. 15
The House of Lords, when referring its question to the ECJ, pointed
to the possibility that the European Union could lose some of its tradi-
tional appeal as a forum for international commercial arbitration. 16
The European Commission, in a Green Paper published after West
Tankers, acknowledged that "legal certainty" surrounding the interface
between the Brussels Regulation and arbitration could be "en-
hance[d]. '"17 Indeed, after the ECJ's decision in West Tankers, the
United States could potentially become more attractive as a seat of
arbitration for parties to transnational agreements interested in ensur-
ing that they do not end up litigating their disputes in multiple
jurisdictions.
This Note argues that in light of the ECJ's decision in West Tank-
ers, parties with concerns about vexatious parallel litigation should
choose the United States as their seat of arbitration. This Note also
advises parties to construct their arbitration agreements carefully to
preserve the option of an antisuit injunction. In response to the ECJ
ban on antisuit injunctions in the context of arbitration, parties and
arbitration counsel in the United States should push for courts to es-
tablish a harmonized standard to which courts can refer when called
to issue an antisuit injunction to enforce an arbitration agreement.
Of course, just as a party may bring vexatious parallel litigation to de-
lay the resolution of a dispute, there is a danger that parties could
abuse the availability of antisuit injunctions by preventing valid litiga-
tion from going forward in a foreign jurisdiction. By enumerating
clear criteria to be met before such an injunction will be issued, courts
can steer clear of such danger, eliminate the confusion surrounding
antisuit injunctions to enforce an arbitration agreement, and provide
15 See Barcel6, supra note 10, at 117-18 (noting that countries might encourage their
courts to adopt antisuit injunctions if the alternative is to "risk a decline in their arbitration
business").
16 West Tankers, [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, [23] ("[I]t should be
noted that the European Community is .. .competing with the rest of the world. If the
Member States of the European Community are unable to offer a seat of arbitration capa-
ble of making orders restraining parties from acting in breach of the arbitration agree-
ment, there is no shortage of other states which will.").
17 Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 onJurisdic-
tion and the Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at 8-9,
COM (2009) 175 final (Apr. 21, 2009) (providing as one such possible enhancement
"grant[ing] exclusive jurisdiction for [court] proceedings [in support of arbitration] to the
courts of the Member State of the place of arbitration, possibly subject to an agreement
between the parties"). For an article highlighting some concerns of European arbitration
practitioners regarding the Green Paper's proposals, see Sarah Garvey, Allen & Overy LLP,
Brussels Considers Reforms to EU Civil Jurisdiction Rules, June 2, 2009, http://www.allenovery.
com/AOWEB/AreasOfExpertise/PrintEditorial.aspx?contentTypelD=l &contentSubType
ID=7944&itemlD=51636&prefLanglD=410.
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guidelines for parties that desire access to such relief. Improved lucid-
ity on the part of U.S. courts will increase the overall attractiveness of
the United States as a place to conduct business in the competitive
global market, reinforce the United States' position as a business-
friendly financial center, and increase work for the American arbitra-
tion bar.
Part I of this Note examines the lead-up to the ECJ's West Tankers
decision, tracing the case's path through English courts to the ECJ.
The case provides a useful comparison of the civil- and common-law
views of antisuit injunctions in the context of arbitration and is a clear
statement by the ECJ that such injunctions will no longer be tolerated
when one EU member state's court, seeking to enforce an arbitration
agreement, enjoins a party from pursuing a parallel proceeding in an-
other member state. Part II briefly describes some recent cases in the
United States dealing with antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration
agreements, illustrating the current availability of such relief in U.S.
courts. This Part also identifies some of the bases upon which courts
issue antisuit injunctions. Part III identifies the class of parties for
which the ECJ's decision in West Tankers and the availability of antisuit
injunctions in the United States are most likely to be important factors
in choosing a seat of arbitration and offers suggestions to parties that
wish to keep antisuit injunctions among the arsenal of tools available
to enforce an arbitration agreement.
I
WEST TANKERS: AN ANTISUIT INJUNCTION
DOOMED FOR FAILURE
A. Factual and Procedural Background
The event that spurred the West Tankers arbitration and litigation
occurred in August 2000. The Front Comor, a vessel chartered by an
Italian oil company, Erg Petroli SpA (Erg), collided with a jetty at
Erg's oil refinery in the Italian port of Syracuse. 18 Erg's insurer, Ras
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta (RAS), paid Erg approximately C15.5
million under Erg's insurance policy for the damage Erg suffered in
the form of repair costs, production losses, and demurrage liabilities
to third parties. 19 The charterparty between the shipowner, West
Tankers, and Erg was to be governed by English law and contained a
clause that called for arbitration of "[a] ny and all differences and dis-
putes of whatsoever nature arising out of [the] charter" to be held in
18 West Tankers Inc. v. Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (The Front Comor),
[2005] EWHC (Comm) 454, [2005] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 240, [2] (Eng. Q.B.).
19 Id.
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London "pursuant to the laws relating to arbitrations there in force."20
Soon after the accident, Erg began arbitration proceedings in London
against West Tankers to collect its uninsured losses. Later, RAS, sub-
rogating itself for Erg, also initiated proceedings against West Tankers
seeking the C15.5 million it had paid to Erg. RAS argued, however,
that it was not party to the arbitration clause in the charterparty and
submitted its claim to a court in Syracuse, Italy,21 making the Italian
court the "first-seized" court under the Brussels Regulation. 22
In an attempt to avert the unenviable situation of having two
claims regarding the same accident pending against it, West Tankers
sought and obtained an interim antisuit injunction from an English
court against RAS prohibiting the insurer from proceeding with its
claim in Italian court.23 Despite this injunction, RAS proceeded with
its Italian action and asked the English Commercial Court to dis-
charge the injunction. 2 4 The Commercial Court denied this request
and issued a permanent injunction. 25 Upon RAS's appeal, the court
certified the case to the House of Lords.2 6
B. The House of Lords' Referral to the ECJ
In an opinion by Lord Leonard Hoffmann, the House of Lords
responded to RAS's argument that an antisuit injunction to enforce
the parties' arbitration agreement was incompatible with the Brussels
Regulation 27 by referring that question to the ECJ. Anticipating that
the ECJ would answer unfavorably, Lord Hoffmann set forth a defense
of the Commercial Court's decision in an effort to preserve the availa-
bility of antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration agreements in the
United Kingdom.
At the outset of his opinion, Lord Hoffmann acknowledged that
two previous decisions by the ECJ, Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srt28 and
Turner v. Grovit,29 demonstrated the ECJ's strong aversion to one
member state's court restricting in any way the jurisdiction of another
member state. Gasser held that a court of a member state upon which
parties have conferred exclusive jurisdiction cannot issue an injunc-
tion to prevent a party from proceeding with an action in another
20 Id. [3].
21 Id. [5], [9].
22 See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
23 West Tankers, [2005] EWHC (Comm) 454, [2005] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 240, [1].
24 Id. [9].
25 Id. [76].
26 West Tankers Inc. v. Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (The "Front Comor"),
[2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, [8].
27 West Tankers, [2005] EWHC (Comm) 454, [2005] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 240, [9].
28 Case C- 16/02, 2003 E.C.R. 1-14693.
29 Case C-159/02, 2004 E.C.R. 1-3565.
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member state if the latter state's courts were first seized of the mat-
ter.30 This remained true even where actions in the first-seized mem-
ber state's court often suffered considerable delays.
3 1
Turner, another case that the House of Lords had referred to the
ECJ, dealt squarely with antisuit injunctions. In that case, the ECJ de-
cided that the Brussels Regulation precluded a member state from
enjoining a party before it from bringing or continuing an action in
another member state, "even where that party is acting in bad faith
with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings. '32 After the ECJ's
decision in Turner, however, English courts continued to issue antisuit
injunctions to enforce arbitration agreements. Lord Hoffmann
pointed out that "[a]rbitration . . . is altogether excluded from the
scope of the [Brussels] Regulation by article 1 (2) (d)" and cited two
ECJ decisions that he understood to uphold this exclusion and ex-
empt arbitration from the Regulation 33: Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Societd
Italiana Impianti PA 34 and Van Uden Maritime BV v. Kommanditgesell-
schaft in Firma Deco-Line.35
The language of the arbitration exclusion in the Brussels Regula-
tion leaves considerable room for interpretation, stating merely, "The
Regulation shall not apply to ... arbitration."36 In Marc Rich, the ECJ
shed some light on the meaning of this exclusion by determining that
it applied not only to arbitration proceedings themselves but also to
court proceedings where the subject matter is arbitration.3 7 For Lord
Hoffmann, Van Uden provided a strong basis for the legality of antisuit
injunctions to enforce arbitration agreements, as it held that in a pro-
ceeding intended to protect the parties' choice to have a dispute set-
tled by arbitration, arbitration is the subject matter.3 8 Lord Hoffmann
argued that the right at issue in West Tankers was precisely the type of
right that the ECJ identified in Van Uden: "the contractual right to
have the dispute determined by arbitration." 39 Lord Hoffmann effec-
tively considered that allowing a party to bring parallel proceedings
30 Gasser, 2003 E.C.R. 1-14693, para. 54.
31 Id. para. 70.
32 Turner, 2004 E.C.R. 1-3565, para. 31.
33 West Tankers Inc. v. Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (The "Front Comor"),
[2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, [14]-[15].
34 Case C-190/89, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3855.
35 Case C-391/95, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7091.
36 Brussels Regulation, supra note 7, art. 1(2).
37 1991 E.C.RI 1-3855, para. 29 ("[T]he exclusion ... extends to litigation pending
before a national court concerning the appointment of an arbitrator, even if the existence
or validity of an arbitration agreement is a preliminary issue in that litigation.").
38 West Tankers, [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, [14]; see Van Uden, 1998
E.C.R. 1-7091, para. 24.
39 West Tankers, [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, [16].
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despite the existence of a valid arbitration agreement would interfere
with party autonomy to choose a method of dispute resolution.
What Lord Hoffmann deemed "the most important considera-
tion" surrounding the availability of antisuit injunctions to enforce ar-
bitration agreements, however, was "the practical reality of arbitration
as a method of resolving commercial disputes."40 In his view, such
injunctions served "as an important and valuable weapon . . .[,]
promot[ing] legal certainty and reduc[ing] the possibility of conflict
between the arbitration award and the judgment of a national
court."41 London-and by extension, Europe-could lose its attrac-
tiveness as a seat for international commercial arbitration if the ECJ
lost sight of the fact that "[t] he courts are there to serve the business
community rather than the other way round. ' 42 Specifically, Lord
Hoffmann pointed to New York, Bermuda, and Singapore as jurisdic-
tions willing to issue antisuit injunctions in support of arbitration
agreements and worried that Europe would "handicap itself by deny-
ing its courts the right to exercise the same jurisdiction. 43
C. The Advocate General's Opinion
After the House of Lords' referral to the ECJ of the question of
the appropriateness of antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration
agreements, there was much anticipation among practitioners, com-
mentators, and students of arbitration surrounding the outcome. 44
The Advocate General's opinion, delivered in September 2008, con-
firmed the premonition that most commentators had had. The Advo-
cate General proposed the following answer to the House of Lords'
referred question:
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on ju-
risdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters precludes a court of a Member State
40 Id. [19].
41 Id. [21].
42 Id. [22].
43 Id. [23].
44 See, e.g., Barcel6, supra note 10, at 116 n.15 ("The West Tankers case is likely to be
best known in the future for the answer the ECJ gives to this important question."); Europe,
42 INT'L LAw. 975, 994 (2008) ("The House of Lords is currently awaiting the ECJ's deter-
mination on this important issue."); Ben Steinbraick, The Impact of EU Law on Anti-Suit
Injunctions in Aid of English Arbitration Proceedings, 26 Crv. JusT. Q. 358, 374 (2007) ("The
Front Comoris likely to become the final knock-out for English anti-suit injunctions in Euro-
pean cross-border dispute resolution."); Thiara Moraes & Adrien Oost, English Courts En-
forcing Arbitration Agreements in the European Context: The Last Refuge for Anti-Suit
Injunctions? 9 (June 2008) (unpublished Master 2 dissertation, Universiti Paris I Pan-
th~on-Sorbonne) (on file with author) ("The significance of the ruling in West Tankers
should not be underestimated. The previous judgments relating to anti-suit injunctions
handed down by the ECJ have done more than affect discretion of English courts regard-
ing equitable remedies.").
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from making an order restraining a person from commencing or
continuing proceedings before the courts of another Member State
because, in the opinion of the court, such proceedings are in
breach of an arbitration agreement. 4
5
The Advocate General conceded that the London arbitration
proceeding and the Italian court proceeding centered upon the same
issue. 46 At the outset of her analysis, she stressed that the concept of
mutual trust4 7 provided the foundation for the ECJ's decisions in Tur-
ner and Gasser"8 and hinted that the court should apply that concept
in the instant case as well. 49 Applying this concept somewhat broadly
before addressing the merits of the parties' positions, she stated that
"the principle of mutual trust can also be infringed by a decision of a
court of a Member State which does not fall within the scope of the
regulation obstructing the court of another Member State from exer-
cising its competence under the regulation. '50 At this point in the
opinion, those sympathetic to West Tankers' position could see the
availability of antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration agreements
within the European Union fading quickly to black.
Before sealing the fate of such injunctions, the Advocate General
entered into a useful discussion of the "dispute between the Anglo-
Saxon and the continental European schools of law whether the
[Brussels Regulation's] exclusion of arbitration should ... be under-
stood in [a] broad sense."5 1 Under the Anglo-Saxon, or common-law,
view, arbitration is the only acceptable forum for resolving a dispute
between parties that have an arbitration agreement, "irrespective of
45 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott, Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers
Inc., 2009 E.C.R. _, 2008 WL 4089512, para. 74.
46 Id. para. 17 ("The main question in both cases is whether West Tankers can rely on
the exclusion from liability for navigation errors in clause 19 of the charterparty or under
the so-called Hague Rules.").
47 See generally Felix Blobel & Patrick Spqth, The Tale of Multilateral Trust and the Euro-
pean Law of Civil Procedure, 30 EUR. L. REv. 528 (2005) (providing an overview of the mu-
tual-trust doctrine). In his House of Lords opinion, Lord Hoffmann anticipated this
catchall policy that cuts against the issuance of antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration
agreements:
In proceedings falling within the Regulation it is right .. . that courts of
Member States should trust each other to apply the Regulation. But in
cases concerning arbitration, falling outside the Regulation, it is in my
opinion equally necessary that Member States should trust the arbitrators
(under the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz) or the court exercising su-
pervisory jurisdiction to decide whether the arbitration clause is binding
and then to enforce that decision by orders which require the parties to
arbitrate and not litigate.
West Tankers, [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, [22].
48 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
49 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott, West Tankers, 2009 E.C.R. -_, 2008 WL 4089512,
paras. 23-26.
50 Id. para. 34.
51 Id. para. 39.
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the substantive subject-matter." 52 Contrastingly, the continental-Euro-
pean, or civil-law, view holds the subject matter to be primary. If the
subject matter falls under the Brussels Regulation, a member state's
court is entitled to "examine whether the exception under Article
1 (2) (d) applies and, according to its assessment of the effectiveness
and applicability of the arbitration clause, to refer the case to the arbi-
tral body or adjudicate on the matter itself"' 5 3
In perhaps the most tenuous portion of the opinion, the Advo-
cate General applied to West Tankers the ECJ's holdings in Marc Rich
and Van Uden 54 to find that the subject matter of the Italian proceed-
ing fell under the Brussels Regulation. The Advocate General argued
that because RAS's claim in the Syracuse court was "a claim in tort
(possibly also in contract) for damages," the claim fell "within the
scope of Regulation No 44/2001, and not arbitration." 55 This view
would seem to fly in the face of the language from Van Uden that Lord
Hoffmann had quoted in the House of Lords' West Tankers opinion:
[P]rovisional measures are not in principle ancillary to arbitration
proceedings but are ordered in parallel to such proceedings and
are intended as measures of support. They concern not arbitration
as such but the protection of a wide variety of rights. Their place in
the scope of the Convention is thus determined not by their own
nature but by the nature of the rights which they serve to protect.56
The Advocate General's subject-matter distinction becomes ques-
tionable when one imagines an alternative scenario: what if West
Tankers had brought an action requesting that an Italian court com-
pel RAS, in light of its subrogation for Erg, to honor the arbitration
agreement, and RAS had brought a "tort" counterclaim against West
Tankers? According to the Advocate General's analysis, would the
subject matter in that case fall under the Brussels Regulation? If not,
then wouldn't a race to the courthouse ensue where each party at-
tempts to bring its claim before the other?
The firmest ground upon which the Advocate General based her
recommendation to the ECJ was the overarching EU policy of harmo-
nizing member states' disparate legal rules regarding multijurisdic-
tional issues to ensure that no member state's court is unfairly denied
jurisdiction. She adopted the European Commission's view that the
52 Id. para. 43.
53 Id. para. 44 (emphasis added).
54 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
55 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott, West Tankers, 2009 E.C.R. -, 2008 WL 4089512,
para. 53.
56 West Tankers Inc. v. Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (The "Front Comor"),
[2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Loyd's Rep. 391, [15] (quoting Case C-391/95, Van Uden Mari-
time BV v. Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7091, para. 33).
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ECJ's decision in Gasser57 protected the right of European courts to
examine their own jurisdiction, including the right to examine the
validity of an arbitration agreement as a preliminary issue to deter-
mine jurisdiction.58 The principle of effet utile, or effective judicial
protection, 59 identified by the Advocate General as "a general princi-
ple of Community law and one of the fundamental rights protected in
the Community,"60 played a large role in her conclusion. The fear
was that a party could abuse the availability of antisuit injunctions to
enforce an arbitration agreement, effectively denying the
counterparty the opportunity to challenge an arbitration agreement
in a court with proper jurisdiction to hear such a claim. 61
In the final portion of the opinion, the Advocate General dis-
missed in a single sentence Lord Hoffmann's concerns that Europe
could lose a competitive edge if the ECJ were to prohibit antisuit in-
junctions to enforce arbitration agreements: "To begin with it must be
stated that aims of a purely economic nature cannot justify infringe-
ments of Community law." 62 Attempting to lessen the harshness of
the opinion, the Advocate General insisted that parallel litigation in a
forum other than the seat of arbitration would only ensue if the par-
ties disagreed as to the validity and scope of their arbitration agree-
ment.63 From this point she made a rather large jump to say, "There
is therefore no risk of circumvention of arbitration."64 This statement
makes light of the very real possibility that a party with superior re-
sources to pay for a protracted legal battle in multiple forums might
be inclined to bring parallel litigation simply to delay the arbitration
proceedings or obstruct a future enforcement attempt by the other
party. In the end, mutual trust and effet utile won out over such wor-
ries. The Advocate General did leave some consoling words for par-
ties considering arbitration in an EU member state who now find
themselves without recourse to an antisuit injunction to enforce an
arbitration agreement: "If an arbitration clause is clearly formulated
and not open to any doubt as to its validity, the national courts have
no reason not to refer the parties to the arbitral body appointed in
57 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
58 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott, West Tankers, 2009 E.C.R. _, 2008 WL 4089512,
paras. 57-58.
59 See, e.g., Steinbrfick, supra note 44, at 367-68 (explaining the difference between
the common-law view ofjurisdiction in terms of private-law rights and the civil-law view of
jurisdiction in terms of public law, guaranteeing the right of access to courts).
60 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott, West Tankers, 2009 E.C.R. _, 2008 WL 4089512,
para. 58.
61 Id. paras. 57-58.
62 Id. para. 66.
63 Id. para. 67.
64 Id. para. 68.
2010] 443
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
accordance with the New York Convention."65 As any student of arbi-
tration knows, this is easier said than done.
D. The ECJ Decision
Unsurprisingly, the ECJ followed the Advocate General's recom-
mendation and held antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration agree-
ments incompatible with the Brussels Regulation. As is typical in ECJ
jurisprudence, the court did not enter into the same level of detailed
analysis as had the Advocate General, and the court basically adopted
the rationale that the Advocate General had enumerated. Two inter-
esting points merit attention, however.
First, rather than focusing primarily on mutual trust or effet utile
as the Advocate General had,66 the court emphasized the nonarbitra-
tion subject matter of Allianz's Italian action as essential in conferring
the Italian court jurisdiction.67 The validity of the parties' arbitration
agreement, a determination that on its face would be outside the
scope of the Brussels Regulation because of the arbitration exception,
was a "preliminary issue" to Allianz's claim in tort, which clearly came
within the scope of the Brussels Regulation. 68 Therefore, "it is ...
exclusively for [the Italian] court to rule ... on its own jurisdiction. ' 69
Second, although the court acknowledged Lord Hoffmann's ap-
peal to the importance of antisuit injunctions in maintaining the at-
tractiveness of Europe as a seat of arbitration, 70 it did not dignify that
practical argument with a response as the Advocate General had.71
Clearly, the court was unmoved by the possibility that Europe could
lose out to other arbitration centers that offer antisuit relief to enforce
arbitration agreements. Also, again unlike the Advocate General,72
the court did not attempt to cushion the blow to parties hoping for
the continued availability of antisuit injunctions in the arbitration
context by hinting that parties could guarantee recourse to arbitration
through the clear drafting of an arbitration agreement.
After this decision by the ECJ, there is no longer any doubt that
antisuit relief will not be a means by which parties who have chosen
London as their seat of arbitration can avoid parallel litigation in
other EU member states. To understand the impact this will have on
65 Id. para. 73.
66 See supra text accompanying notes 46-50, 57-61.
67 See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc., 2009 E.C.R. -, 2009 WL
303723, paras. 25-27.
68 Id. paras. 26-27.
69 Id. para. 27.
70 Id. para. 17.
71 See supra text accompanying note 62.
72 See supra text accompanying note 65.
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parties' choice of a seat of arbitration, it is first necessary to examine
the current availability of antisuit relief in U.S. courts.
II
AvAiLABILITY OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ANTISUIT
INJUNCTIONS TO ENFORCE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Second Circuit: A Standard in Flux
The most recent significant appellate cases influencing the availa-
bility of antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration agreements were
decided by the Second Circuit 73 within six months of one another in
2004. Judge Dennis Jacobs penned the opinions of both Paramedics
Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Medical Systems Information Technol-
ogies, Inc.7 4 and LAJFXSPRL v. Axtel, S.A. de C. V, 7 5 yet at first glance, it
appears that the court employed differing standards in determining
whether to issue an antisuit injunction to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment. In Paramedics, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the federal
policy in favor of arbitration 76 to enjoin a party from continuing its
action in a Brazilian court.7 7 In LAF X, the same court gave much
greater deference to comity concerns and rejected a party's request
for an antisuit injunction to stop a Mexican action from proceeding. 7
An examination of these cases and their progeny reveals that antisuit
injunctions are certainly available as a remedy to enforce an arbitra-
tion agreement. 79 Parties interested in ensuring the availability of
such relief,80 however, may have trouble deciphering the formula re-
quired to do so.
73 This Part's focus on the Second Circuit is not intended to suggest that other cir-
cuits have not developed case law on antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration agree-
ments. It is true that the Second Circuit houses New York, the United States' most
substantial hub of litigation arising from transnational agreements and the most com-
monly selected U.S. seat for international commercial arbitration, and has thus generated
several important decisions in that domain. More importantly for the purposes of this
Note, however, the Second Circuit is within the "conservative" camp of circuits with respect
to antisuit injunctions enjoining parties from pursuing parallel proceedings in foreign ve-
nues. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Exploring the Second Circuit's case law in
this area, therefore, provides a picture of what is required to obtain such injunctions in a
circuit that, relative to others, is reluctant to grant them.
74 369 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2004).
75 390 F,3d 194 (2d Cir. 2004).
76 See infra Part II.B.1.
77 Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 653-54.
78 LAIF X 390 F.3d at 199-200.
79 See Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 652 ("It is beyond question that a federal court may
enjoin a party before it from pursuing litigation in a foreign forum.").
80 See infra Part III.A.
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1. Paramedics: A Step in the Right Direction
Paramedics involved a dispute between GE Medical and its Brazil-
ian distributor, Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, also known as
Tecnimed. 81 The parties had included a broad arbitration clause in
their agreements, and when a dispute arose between them, GE Medi-
cal notified Tecnimed that it was initiating arbitration proceedings.8 2
Rather than submitting to arbitration, Tecnimed filed a complaint
with a court in Porto Alegre, Brazil.83 Pursuing an aggressive strategy,
Tecnimed also filed a petition for a permanent stay of the arbitration
in New York State court.8 4 GE Medical responded by removing the
action to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
and counterclaimed, requesting that the court compel arbitration and
enjoin Tecnimed from proceeding with its Brazilian action.8 5 GE
Medical prevailed: the district court held the arbitration clauses valid
and issued an antisuit injunction against Tecnimed.8 6
The Second Circuit's opinion in China Trade & Development Corp.
v. M. V Choong Yong87 provided the framework forJudge Jacobs's anal-
ysis in Paramedics. That decision enumerated the so-called conserva-
tive standard followed by the Second Circuit, which warned that
antisuit injunctions are an extraordinary form of relief to be issued
"'with care and great restraint.' "8 Judge Jacobs pulled from China
Trade the threshold requirements for any antisuit injunction: that "(A)
the parties [be] the same in both matters, and (B) resolution of the
case before the enjoining court [be] dispositive of the action to be
enjoined."8 9 Over Tecnimed's objections, the Second Circuit upheld
the district court's determination that both of these requirements had
been fulfilled.
After the threshold requirements have been satisfied, other fac-
tors that a court will examine include whether the foreign suit at issue
threatens the strong public policies or jurisdiction of the enjoining
forum.90 Before entering into analysis of these factors, Judge Jacobs
reiterated the special nature of antisuit injunctions, borrowing lan-
guage from the D.C. Circuit, another follower of the conservative stan-
dard: "'an anti-suit injunction will issue . . . only when the strongest
81 Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 649.
82 Id. at 649-50.
83 Id. at 650.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 650-51.
87 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
88 Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 652 (quoting China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36).
89 Id. (citing China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35).
90 Id. (citing China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36).
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equitable factors favor its use."' 9 1 Nonetheless, this "ritual incanta-
tion"92 proved to be only that, as the Second Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's antisuit injunction against Tecnimed.9 3 The grounds
upon which the court justified the injunction were the federal policy
in favor of upholding arbitration agreements 94 and diminished comity
concerns "where one court has already reached a judgment-on the
same issues, involving the same parties."95 Here, the judgment to
which the Second Circuit was referring was the district court's grant-
ing of an antisuit injunction against Tecnimed. 96
Paramedics represented an important, seemingly clear separation
between antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration agreements and
antisuit injunctions sought for other purposes, with the federal policy
in favor of arbitration providing the boost necessary to clear the high
hurdle of comity. Six months later, however, the Second Circuit cast
into doubt the importance of the federal policy in favor of arbitration
with its decision in LAYF X SPRL v. Axtel, S.A. de C. V.9 7
2. LAIF X: Paramedics'Progress Halted
The bylaws of Axtel, a Mexican telecommunications company,
contained a clause requiring disputing shareholders to resolve their
differences by negotiation followed by arbitration in New York under
the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).98 LAIF IV, a
company organized under the laws of Bermuda, assigned to LAIF X,
91 Id. at 654 (quoting Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 931-32 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
92 Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima S.A. v. Pagnan S.p.A. (The "Angelic Grace"),
[1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 87, 96 (Eng. C.A.) (Millett, L.J., concurring). This was the apt term
that Lord Justice Peter Millett employed to describe the pronouncement ubiquitous in
English antisuit-injunction decisions that such relief should be granted sparingly due to
comity concerns.
93 Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 658-59.
94 Id. at 654 ("The federal policy favoring the liberal enforcement of arbitration
clauses ... applies with particular force in international disputes.").
95 Id. at 655.
96 Daniel Tan has criticized this element of the Second Circuit's reasoning, arguing
that the federal policy in favor of arbitration was the court's only valid ground for issuing
the antisuit injunction:
[1]t is difficult to comprehend how a lower court's decision could allay po-
tential comity concerns that an appellate court could have in deciding
whether to grant antisuit relief: An appellate court cannot bootstrap a lower
court's decision to bolster its own, but must instead review the lower court's
decision to see if it was correctly made. The Second Circuit's approach of
using the lower court's grant of antisuit relief to bolster its own affirmation
of that order would reduce the standard of issuance for antisuit injunctions
on appeal, without any principled basis for this.
Tan, supra note 11, at 564.
97 390 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2004).
98 Id. at 197.
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its Belgian affiliate, subscription rights to purchase shares of Axtel.9 9
In early 2003, LAIF X exercised these subscription rights, believing
that it had become the controlling shareholder of one class of
shares.10 0 In response, Telinor, Axtel's previous controlling share-
holder, acquired and converted enough shares in that class to prevent
LAIF X from gaining the controlling stake that it believed it had right-
fully acquired. 10 1
After the required negotiation period elapsed without any resolu-
tion of the dispute, LAIF X filed a demand for arbitration.1 0 2 Telinor,
before filing its answer with the AAA, brought suit in Monterrey, Mex-
ico seeking a declaration that would render LAIF IV's assignment of
shares to LAIF X invalid.1 0 3 Telinor then filed an answer in the arbi-
tration proceeding, requesting that the AAA hold the dispute nonar-
bitrable or, in the alternative, stay the arbitration pending Telinor's
Mexican action.1 0 4 Six days later, LAIF X requested that the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York compel Telinor to
participate in arbitration and enjoin Telinor from pursuing its Mexi-
can lawsuit. The district court denied relief.'0 5
Once again, Judge Jacobs authored the opinion that would deter-
mine whether antisuit relief was appropriate. Paramedics was cited as a
controlling case, and the same factors determining whether an an-
tisuit injunction should be granted were laid out at the beginning of
the court's analysis of that issue. 10 6 Curiously, however, the opinion
merely paid lip service to the federal policy in favor of arbitration that
had been essential to Paramedics' holding and focused primarily on
comity concerns to uphold the district court's ruling "because: (i)
principles of comity counsel against issuing the anti-suit injunction;
(ii) the United States federal courts have no interest in enjoining Teli-
nor's Mexican lawsuit; and (iii) Telinor's Mexican lawsuit is not di-
rected at sidestepping arbitration." 0 7 Judge Jacobs went as far as to
imply that arbitration sited in New York "in no way implicates 'the
strong public policies"' of a U.S. court.10 8
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 197-98.
104 Id. at 198.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 199.
107 Id. at 200.
108 Id. (quoting Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info.
Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 652 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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Some commentators and practitioners have offered ways to make
sense of this puzzling pair of Second Circuit decisions. 10 9 The only
conclusion that could be drawn from these two cases was that the stan-
dard for granting antisuit relief was less than clear.
3. Paramedics and LAIF X's Progeny: Making Sense of an Unclear
Standard
Perhaps somewhat predictably, since Paramedics and LAIF X,
courts presented with the question of whether to issue an antisuit in-
junction to enforce an arbitration agreement have varied widely in the
analysis employed to come to a decision. By identifying some of the
common threads in the case law, a clearer picture of the availability of
antisuit relief begins to form.
a. Vexatiousness of the Parallel Litigation
Although the federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements and comity concerns were the central factors by
which the Second Circuit determined whether or not an antisuit in-
junction was appropriate in Paramedics and LAIF X, whether the party
bringing a parallel action in a foreign jurisdiction recognized the va-
lidity of the arbitration agreement also played a key role. In
Paramedics, Tecnimed flatly refused to arbitrate and instead sought to
resolve its dispute in a Brazilian court.110 In LAIF XY, on the other
hand, in denying antisuit relief, the court was influenced by the fact
that Telinor "submitted itself to the arbitral forum . . . and invoked
the discretion of the arbitral forum to stay proceedings in deference
to the Mexican court on a point of Mexican law." ' The Second Cir-
cuit stopped short of holding that parallel litigation brought in bad
109 See, e.g., Chris Karagheuzoff & Eric Epstein, Navigating Muddy Waters: Anti-Foreign
Suit Injunctions in Aid of Compelling Arbitration, Disp. RESOL. J., May-July 2008, at 62, 66-69
(arguing that parties' choice of an American jurisdiction's substantive law renders the
granting of an antisuit injunction to enforce an arbitration agreement more likely); Swan-
son, supra note 14, at 437-40 (identifying a federal policy favoring liberal enforcement of
arbitration agreements and comity as two factors used in the balancing test); Daniel Tan,
Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Vexing Problem of Comity, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 283, 323-24, 329-31
(2005) (suggesting that the crucial question in Paramedics and LAF X is either the Second
Circuit's interest in granting antisuit relief, which was comparatively less in a case such as
LAF X where no U.S. parties were involved, or a party's intent to commence parallel for-
eign proceedings).
110 369 F.3d at 656 ("Tecnimed has not demonstrated a diligent attempt to comply
with the district court's orders [to submit to arbitration and have its Brazilian suit dis-
missed] in a reasonable manner. Tecnimed's explanations as to why the case had to be
suspended, rather than dismissed, are specious.").
111 390 F.3d at 200.
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faith would doom a party to an antisuit injunction, but it made clear
that such a dilatory strategy would be viewed unfavorably. 1 2
Several subsequent decisions in the Second Circuit demonstrate
that parties bringing vexatious parallel litigation are more likely to
face antisuit injunctions. In Empresa Generadora de Electricidad ITABO,
S.A. v. Corporaci6n Dominicana de Empresas Elgctricas Estatales,113 the de-
fendant CDEEE, arguing that its dispute with Empresa Generadora
was nonarbitrable, simultaneously filed an answer with the arbitral tri-
bunal and brought an action in the Dominican Republic. The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York found that
CDEEE did "not appear materially [to be] delaying, or even directly
interfering with, the ongoing arbitration, for both are proceeding si-
multaneously" 114 and denied Empresa Generadora antisuit relief.
Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara 15 reads like an international litigation nightmare (or an
international litigator's dream). Karaha Bodas Company (KBC), a
Cayman Islands company owned by American investors, entered into
ajoint venture with Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara (Pertamina), an Indonesian government-owned entity, to de-
velop geothermal energy resources in Indonesia. In 1998, following a
dispute between the parties and pursuant to an arbitration clause in
their contract, KBC obtained an arbitration award against Pertamina
in Switzerland. 116 Pertamina's action to set aside the award in Switzer-
land failed, but it was able to convince an Indonesian court not only
that the court had set-aside jurisdiction-which the court exercised to
set aside the award-but also to enjoin KBC from pursuing its en-
forcement action filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas.1 17 In response, KBC successfully sought an anti-antisuit
injunction from the district court, but the Fifth Circuit vacated that
decision, citing comity principles and the fact that KBC had no assets
in Indonesia vulnerable to the Indonesian court's injunction.118 KBC
ultimately prevailed in its enforcement action in the Southern District
of Texas and brought that judgment to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York for registration and enforcement. 119
Pertamina, still unwilling to give up its fight almost ten years after the
112 Id. at 199 ("[G]iven '[t]he federal policy favoring the liberal enforcement of arbi-
tration clauses,' an anti-suit injunction may be proper where a party initiates foreign pro-
ceedings in 'an attempt to sidestep arbitration.'" (quoting Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 654)).
113 No. 05 CIV 5004 RMB, 2005 WL 1705080 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2005).
114 Id. at *9 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
115 500 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2007).
116 Id. at 113-14.
117 Id. at 114.
118 Id. at 114-15.
119 Id. at 116.
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original dispute, brought a fraud action against KBC in the latter's
home jurisdiction, the Cayman Islands. 120  Once again, KBC peti-
tioned for an antisuit injunction, this time from the Southern District
of New York, and the district court granted relief.121
Upholding the antisuit injunction against Pertamina's Cayman Is-
lands action, the Second Circuit did little to mask its lack of sympathy
for Pertamina:
Pertamina engaged in ... six years of litigation in the United States
without any mention of its claim of fraud. Finally, at the very mo-
ment when the litigation was to be legitimately ended, Pertamina
brought the action in the Cayman Islands after engaging in literal
subterfuge in dealing with the Court in New York.122
These decisions, along with several other recent cases either
before the Second Circuit or one of its district courts, 123 demonstrate
that even courts that follow the so-called conservative standard for
granting antisuit injunctions are willing to issue antisuit relief where
the parallel litigation in question is obviously vexatious in nature. The
fact that the federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
agreements underpins this willingness 124 bodes well for parties with
valid arbitration agreements who wish to prevent costly parallel pro-
ceedings. It is also essential, however, to identify substantive bases for
courts' determinations of whether antisuit relief should issue.
b. Substantive Law of the Agreement
Parties' choice of substantive law governing their agreement has
also influenced the outcome of petitions for antisuit relief. Well
before Paramedics and LAFXwere decided, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York made this apparent in PepsiCo Inc.
v. Oficina Central de Asesoria y Ayuda Tecnica, C.A. 125 In that case, a
dispute arose between the U.S. soft-drink giant and its Venezuelan
bottling facilities when the latter committed the mortal sin of shifting
its business to Coca Cola, and PepsiCo cried foul. 126 The parties'
agreement included an arbitration clause that called for arbitration in
120 Id. at 117.
121 Id. at 117-18.
122 Id. at 126-27 (quoting In reKaraha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak
Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 465 F. Supp. 2d 283, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
123 See, e.g., Mastercard Int'l Inc. v. Federation Internationale de Football Ass'n, No. 06
Civ. 3036(LAP), 2007 WL 631312, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2007) (granting antisuit relief in
an opinion that begins: "FIFA's latest actions demonstrate that it still does not govern itself
by its slogan, 'fair play.'"); Storm LLC v. Telenor Mobile Commc'ns AS, No. 06 Civ.
13157(GEL), 2006 WL 3735657, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006) ("Where [vexatiousness] is
present, little else is required to authorize an injunction.").
124 See supra note 112.
125 945 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
126 Id. at 70-71.
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New York in which the arbitrators would apply New York substantive
law in the event of any dispute between the parties.127 The agreement
also included a clause, however, that identified Venezuelan law as the
governing law of the agreement. 128 The district court thus concluded
that the parties intended to have Venezuelan law determine arbi-
trability and accordingly denied PepsiCo's petition to enjoin Oficina
Central's action to determine arbitrability before a Venezuelan
court.129
The same district court further highlighted the importance of
choice of law in Suchodolski Associates, Inc. v. Cardell Financial Corp.,l30 a
case in which antisuit relief was granted. Notwithstanding an agree-
ment to arbitrate in New York, Suchodolski commenced parallel pro-
ceedings in a Brazilian court, and Cardell sought an antisuit
injunction from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Unlike the situation in LAIF X, where the dispute was be-
tween shareholders in a company organized under the laws of Mexico,
the parties in Suchodolski had chosen New York law to govern their
agreement.' 3 ' The district court thus held that antisuit relief was war-
ranted, as no questions under Brazilian law were relevant to the dis-
pute at hand.132
B. Bases for Antisuit Relief to Enforce Arbitration Agreements
1. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements
In spite of the longstanding debate among U.S. circuit courts as
to the proper standard for issuing antisuit injunctions in contexts
other than arbitration, 133 the Second Circuit, a staunch member of
the "conservative" camp, has exhibited its willingness to issue such re-
lief in support of arbitration agreements. The "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements"'134 is certainly one of the main cata-
lysts of this readiness to enforce arbitration agreements with antisuit
127 Id. at 70.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 72.
130 Nos. 03 Civ. 4148(WHP), 04 Civ. 5732(WHP), 2006 WL 3327625 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16,
2006).
131 Id. at *2.
132 Id. ("Plaintiffs' reliance on LAJFX... is misplaced.... LALFdeclined to enjoin the
Mexican action in part because it involved questions arising under Mexican law. Here,
the . . . claim is governed by New York law." (citation omitted)).
133 Again, the intricacies of the "liberal" and "conservative" standards for antisuit relief
in nonarbitration matters are not the focus of this Note. For an overview of the standards
and empirical data concerning the issuance of antisuit injunctions, see Margarita Trevifio
de Coale, Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin, or Abstain ?: A Survey of Foreign Parallel Litigation in the Federal
Courts of the United States, 17 B.U. ItqT'L L.J. 79, 85-110 (1999).
134 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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relief. Since Congress's adoption in 1970 of the New York Convention
in the form of Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),135
U.S. courts have progressively shown themselves to be more and more
supportive of alternative dispute resolution in the form of arbitration.
The U.S. Supreme Court's 1985 seminal decision in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.136 emphasized the federal
bench's increasing willingness to send parties to arbitration. The
Court held the parties' arbitration agreement to be valid, rejecting
Soler's argument that a U.S. court, and not an arbitral tribunal,
should decide certain antitrust issues, insisting that the "federal policy
[favoring arbitration] applies with special force in the field of interna-
tional commerce."137 This decision was certainly a strong indicator
that parties with arbitration agreements would be expected to honor
them and compelled to do so if they did not. It is a logical progres-
sion for courts to use equitable relief in the form of antisuit injunc-
tions to enforce arbitration agreements and to further the federal
policy favoring arbitration.
2. Antisuit Relief as the Enforcement of a Contractual Obligation
American law students learn in their first contracts course that a
court can grant damages or enjoin a party in order to enforce contrac-
tual obligations.1I" Although an arbitration agreement is certainly a
particular type of contractual provision that engenders much dispute,
there is no reason to enforce a party's adherence to such an agree-
ment in a manner different from standard contract terms. Indeed,
the U.S. Supreme Court has recently stated as much: "Section 2 [of
the FAA] embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places
arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts."'1 39
The issuance of an antisuit injunction to enforce a contractual agree-
ment to arbitrate is merely recognizing parties' wishes (at least at the
time of the signing of the contract) to stay out of court and settle their
disputes through arbitration. 140
135 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2006).
136 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
137 Id. at 631.
138 See, e.g., Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Il1. App. 542, 548 (1932) (en-
joining a boxer who violated a contract with the venue from participating in any other
boxing matches).
139 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); see also Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) ("[P]assage of the [FAA] was moti-
vated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which par-
ties had entered .... ").
140 See Tan, supra note 11, at 584 ("An antisuit injunction enjoining court proceedings
commenced in breach of the arbitration agreement will be, in many instances, the only way
to effectively vindicate the breach and uphold the agreement of the parties.").
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This is precisely the justification that numerous English courts
have given for issuing antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration agree-
ments. One such court issued an antisuit injunction for the declared
purpose of "enforc[ing] the contractual bargain that there should be
arbitration in London."' 41 Effectively, this contractual view of arbitra-
tion agreements holds that parties, much like in forum-selection
clauses, have agreed that there will only be one forum in which the
parties may settle their disputes. An antisuit injunction seems to be an
ideal medium by which a court may enforce such an agreement. 142
When antisuit relief is viewed from the angle of enforcement of a
contractual promise to settle disputes exclusively by arbitration, it be-
comes difficult to understand the reason for the controversy that such
relief often generates. A court that determines an arbitration agree-
ment to be valid and then issues an antisuit injunction is merely forc-
ing a party to keep its promise to submit to arbitration. Civilian courts
and legal scholars have historically, however, expressed their bitter
disdain for such measures and see them as unwelcome restrictions on
the courts' sovereign jurisdiction. 143 This difference may be an in-
stance, however, where civil- and common-law jurisdictions will simply
have to agree to disagree, as "part of the problem may simply be one
of perception rooted in differences in legal culture.' 1 44 That is to say,
based on common-law precepts, the issuance of an antisuit injunction
is not inherently offensive to a foreign jurisdiction, as it merely up-
k
141 Welex A.G. v. Rosa Maritime Ltd. (The "Epsilon Rosa") (No. 2), [2002] EWHC
(Comm) 2033, [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 701, [23] (Eng. Q.B.), affd, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 938,
[2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509 (Eng. C.A.).
142 See Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima S.A. v. Pagnan S.p.A. (The "Angelic
Grace"), [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 87, 94-95 (Eng. C.A.) ("Proceedings in a foreign Court are
in breach of contract, so an injunction can issue to restrain them .... [I]f [the foreign
action sought to be enjoined continued], there would follow two parallel sets of proceed-
ings where the arbitration clause had been contractually designed to ensure that there was
only one.").
143 See, e.g., West Tankers Inc. v. Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (The Front
Comor), [2005] EWHC (Comm) 454, [2005] All. E.R. (Comm.) 240, [43] (Eng. Q.B.)
("[S]uch injunctions constitute an infringement of the jurisdiction of Germany because
the German courts alone decide, in accordance with the procedural laws governing them
and in accordance with existing international agreements, whether they are competent to
adjudicate on a matter or whether they must respect the jurisdiction of another domestic
or a foreign court (including arbitration courts). Furthermore, foreign courts cannot issue
instructions as to whether and, if so, to what extent (in relation to time-limits and issues) a
German court can and may take action in a particular case." (quoting In re The Enforce-
ment of an English Anti-Suit Injunction, Oberlandegericht [OLG] Dfisseldorf [Regional
Court of Appeal of Diisseldorf] Jan. 10, 1996, [1997] I.L. Pr. 320, para. 14 (F.R.G.))); see
also Stephen M. Schwebel, Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration: An Overview, in
INT'L ARBITRATION INST., supra note 4, at 5, 5 (asserting that antisuit injunctions "appear[ ]
to violate conventional and customary international law, international public policy and
the accepted principles of international arbitration").
144 Tan, supra note 11, at 591.
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holds an agreement between parties to a contract. 145 Of course, if
some important public policy of another country is at issue, the role of
comity suddenly becomes more important, and a court should think
long and hard before issuing antisuit relief.1 46
With this picture of the current availability of antisuit injunctions
to enforce arbitration agreements in the United States and their un-
derlying justifications in mind, it is possible to point to steps that par-
ties may take to increase the likelihood that a U.S. court will grant
such relief in the event of a dispute. Before entering into this discus-
sion, however, it is first necessary to identify the parties who will likely
be most affected by the ECJ's holding in West Tankers.147
III
POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES OF ANTISUIT RELIEF FROM U.S.
COURTS AND How PARTIES CAN ENSURE
ITS AvAItAILITv
A. Potentially Interested Parties
As evidenced by the plethora of commentary that West Tankers
sparked,148 at the very least, arbitration counsel and parties drafting
arbitration agreements should take into account the ECJ's holding
that antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration agreements are not
permissible between EU member states. Of course, the availability of
antisuit injunctions is only one of many factors that parties should
consider before choosing the seat of their potential arbitration. It
would certainly be hyperbole to state that West Tankers will result in an
unprecedented geographical shift of arbitration. After all, Paris has
historically been an epicenter of arbitration, 149 and French courts are
typically civilian in their refusal to issue antisuit injunctions to enforce
145 For a more complete discussion on why antisuit relief to enforce arbitration agree-
ments does not usually implicate comity, see generally Tan, supra note 109.
146 See Barcel6, supra note 10, at 108 ("[Rlelatively strong public policy considerations
[in the country where a party has brought a parallel proceeding] ... should be respected
(to the extent of not being thwarted by an anti-suit injunction)-even if the parties' prefer-
ence for arbitration is clearly expressed.").
147 See supra Parts I.C and I.D.
148 See, e.g., Tom Lidstrom, Linklaters, View from Here: Much Ado About Nothing, June 28,
2007, http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/1165601/view-much-ado; Herbert
Smith, Arbitration E-Bulletin: AG Opines in West Tankers: Anti-Suit Injunctions in Support of
Arbitration Agreements Incompatible with Brussels Regulation, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.herbert
smith.com/NR/rdonlyres/7FEOF3D6-7DA5-4E1 B-AE5 1-B79B60A1 4231/8306/West
Tankersebulletin050908.html; supra note 44 and accompanying text.
149 See INT'L FIN. SERVS. LONDON, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN LONDON
2008, at 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.ifsl.org.uk/upload/PBDispute Resolution
2008.pdf (giving statistics for International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration and
identifying Paris as one of the most frequently selected sites since 2000 and the most popu-
lar site in 2007).
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arbitration agreements. 150 Other factors that weigh heavily in parties'
choice of a seat include geographic convenience, language, develop-
ment of relevant areas of substantive law, and expertise of local
counsel.
Before identifying parties that may want to consider choosing a
U.S. city over cities within the European Union as a seat for potential
arbitrations, it is important to recognize the legal limits of the ECJ's
decision in West Tankers. The ECJ's jurisdiction only extends to the
borders of the member states of the European Union. Therefore, an
English court can still enjoin a party from pursuing parallel litigation
in non-EUjurisdictions.'15  Additionally, the ECJ's opinion is directed
to the courts of EU member states, and parties may still grant arbitral
tribunals the authority to issue antisuit injunctions. 152 Obtaining such
relief from an arbitral tribunal does not, however, always result in an
enforceable arbitral award. 1 53
With these limits in mind, a discernable class of parties stands to
benefit from choosing a location in the United States rather than Eu-
rope as a seat of arbitration because of the West Tankers decision. As a
threshold matter, the contract in question must be commercial in na-
ture and must not implicate any serious public policy.' 54 Additionally,
the parties must be in a financial position to participate in arbitration
or litigation in either the United States or Europe. Quite obviously,
regional European parties with little or no experience in the United
States will be loath to participate in arbitration or seek enforcement of
an arbitral award in a U.S. city because options such as Geneva,
London, or Paris are far more convenient. The cost of participating
in arbitration in the United States may well be prohibitive for such
parties. For multinational corporations with greater resources and ex-
perience hiring counsel on both sides of the Atlantic, such a problem
would not be present.
For an antisuit injunction to have its intended effect, both parties
must also have somewhat substantial and nonfungible assets in both
the United States and Europe. A party with no assets in the United
States and no interest in developing business there will not necessarily
be persuaded by an antisuit injunction issued by a U.S. court to cease
150 Cf Tan, supra note 11, at 590. But see Banque Worms v. Epoux Brachot, Cour de
cassation [French Supreme Court], Cass. le civ., Nov. 19, 2002, Bull. civ. I, No. 275 (en-
joining a party from pursuing parallel proceedings in Spain and compelling participation
in French bankruptcy proceedings), quoted in Tan, supra note 11, at 596 n.175.
151 See, e.g., Shashoua v. Sharma, [2009] EWHC (Comm) 957, [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
376, [35]-[39] (Eng. Q.B.) (stating that the ECJ's ruling in West Tankers does not apply to
an antisuit injunction intended to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in London and to
prevent parallel proceedings in India).
152 See Levy, supra note 4, at 121-24.
153 See supra note 4.
154 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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a parallel action in an EU member state. Again, multinational corpo-
rations with significant operations in the United States and Europe
will easily fulfill this requirement.
Parties that satisfy these threshold criteria would do well to con-
sider the United States as a seat for arbitration largely for the same
reasons that parties choose arbitration over public litigation in the
first place. Parties see the neutrality of arbitral tribunals as one of the
main advantages of arbitration as compared to public litigation. 55 If
parallel proceedings are brought in violation of an arbitration agree-
ment in one party's home jurisdiction, suddenly the other party faces
exactly the risk that it sought to avoid by agreeing to arbitrate: the risk
of bias. It is conceivable that a U.S. party engaged in arbitration with a
non-U.S. party might benefit from such bias in seeking an antisuit in-
junction from a U.S. court. This concern evaporates, however, if
neither of the parties involved is American. In that situation, both the
arbitral tribunal and the U.S. court entertaining a petition for antisuit
relief would presumably be neutral. 156
Parties involved in long-term contractual relationships also often
elect to settle their disputes through arbitration to avoid protracted
legal battles and increase the likelihood that their partnership will last
as long as it is in the interest of both parties. The specter of expensive
multijurisdictional litigation threatens such long-term goals. By
choosing a jurisdiction in which antisuit relief is among the available
tools to ensure that a dispute will be settled by an arbitral tribunal,
parties can enjoy greater certainty that their disputes will be settled
quickly and efficiently.
Another reason for which parties may choose arbitration is pref-
erence for a compromise-type resolution process rather than the win-
ner-take-all philosophy of public litigation. 157 By choosing a forum
that offers antisuit injunctions that could potentially preclude the pos-
155 See Christian Bihring-Uhle, A Survey on Arbitration and Settlement in International Bus-
iness Disputes: Advantages of Arbitration, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 25, 31 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W.
Naimark eds., 2005) (reporting that over eighty percent of survey respondents identified
forum neutrality as highly relevant in their choice of arbitration to settle disputes).
156 It is well established that U.S. courts will hear petitions for antisuit relief to enforce
arbitration agreements even if neither party involved is American. See, e.g., Victory Transp.
Inc. v. Comisarfa General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir.
1964) ("By agreeing to arbitrate in New York, where the United States Arbitration Act
makes such agreements specifically enforceable, the Comisaria General must be deemed to
have consented to the jurisdiction of the court that could compel the arbitration proceed-
ing in New York."), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
157 See, e.g., Bfihring-Uhle, supra note 155, at 32-33 (labeling "amicability" as a "slight
advantage[ ]" of arbitration over public litigation cited by survey respondents); Jens Dam-
mann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 34 &
n.96 (2008) ("[A]rbitrators are commonly chosen (directly or indirectly) and paid by the
parties, giving the arbitrators an interest in rendering decisions that will maximize the
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sibility of epic multijurisdictional legal battles, parties can make it
more likely that the spirit of their dispute resolution will be less con-
tentious and increase the chances of their contractual relationship
continuing, if they so desire.
Finally, parties with serious confidentiality or reputational con-
cerns that have a strong incentive to stay out of public litigation 158
may hold the availability of antisuit relief to be important. Again, an-
tisuit injunctions can actualize parties' desires to stay out of court and
avoid potentially harmful publicity in several jurisdictions. A party can
potentially gain peace of mind from the knowledge that, given a well-
drafted arbitration agreement, any dispute arising from its contract is
less likely to be aired publicly in multiple jurisdictions.
B. Maximizing the Availability of Antisuit Injunctions
After parties have determined that the availability of antisuit re-
lief is an important enough factor to choose the United States for the
seat of their potential arbitration, what can they do to increase the
likelihood that, should a dispute arise, a U.S. court will enjoin any
attempt to bring parallel proceedings in violation of the arbitration
agreement? Unfortunately, as described in Part II, given the current
state of the law regarding antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration
agreements, there is no guaranteed way to have access to antisuit in-
junctions. Taking a lesson from the recent antisuit-relief jurispru-
dence in U.S. courts, however, it would seem that there are some steps
that parties can take.
Drafting an arbitration agreement is no simple task. To ensure
that arbitration takes place as the parties envision, serious considera-
tion must be given to drafting as airtight a clause as possible. Gener-
ally, and crucially in the case of parties specifically seeking the
availability of antisuit relief in the United States, the arbitration clause
must clearly enumerate the seat of arbitration.1 59 Under the New
York Convention, the law of the seat of arbitration serves as the lex
arbitri and partially governs the enforceability of an arbitral award.' 60
Thus, if parties are explicit in choosing a location within the United
States as their seat of arbitration, U.S. courts will not hesitate to apply
U.S. lex arbitri and will entertain the possibility of antisuit relief.
chances that they will be chosen again in future disputes. The result is an incentive to
render compromised judgments that do not badly offend either party.").
158 See, e.g., Bfilhring-Uhle, supra note 155, at 32 (reporting that survey respondents
identified "confidentiality of the procedure" as an "important advantage[ ]" of
arbitration).
159 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS:
DRAFTnNG AND ENFORCING 61-67 (2d ed. 2006) (stressing the importance of identifying a
seat of arbitration and giving examples of good and bad clauses doing so).
160 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e).
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Parties interested in the availability of antisuit injunctions from
U.S. courts may also want to specify that U.S. law governs the arbitra-
tion agreement itself.161 This specification will lessen the likelihood
that U.S. courts will defer to other jurisdictions in determining the
validity of the arbitration clause. As PepsiCo demonstrates, 162 if parties
choose another country's law to govern their contract and choose a
seat of arbitration within the United States without specifying that
U.S. law shall govern the arbitration agreement, a court will likely ap-
ply the law governing the container contract to decide whether the
arbitration clause is valid. Moreover, a clause identifying the law gov-
erning the arbitration agreement will permit a court to regard an arbi-
tration agreement purely as a contractual term and potentially reduce
the concerns of comity that might enter into a court's calculus.1 63
Parties could go even further and specify in their arbitration agree-
ment that any proceedings contesting the existence, validity, or scope
of the arbitration agreement shall be held in the courts of the chosen
seat of arbitration. This detail would render courts of other forums
incapable of complaining that their jurisdiction had been usurped, 164
unless a significant public policy issue was at stake. 165
Finally, as the cases discussed in Part II.A.3.b demonstrate, if par-
ties choose the law of a U.S. jurisdiction as the substantive law gov-
erning their contract, a U.S. court will be less likely to permit parallel
proceedings to continue in violation of an arbitration agreement.
With the law of a U.S. jurisdiction governing the agreement, the di-
minished relevance of a foreign jurisdiction's input lessens comity
concerns. Obviously, many considerations enter into the fray when
parties choose the substantive law that will govern performance of a
contract. 166 However, parties identified in Part III.A with commercial
contracts that do not implicate a specialized domain of law in which
the United States is not as highly developed as another jurisdiction
161 See BoRN, supra note 159, at 75 (offering an example of such a clause: "This [Article
X] and all arbitral proceeding [sic] conducted hereunder shall be governed by the laws of
_ " , (alteration in original)).
162 See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
163 See supra Part II.B.2.
164 Cf Barcel6, supra note 10, at 110-11 ("[W]here [a court of the seat of arbitration
(Fl)], interpreting and applying its own, party-chosen law, finds a dispute arbitrable and
enjoins a litigant from proceeding anew in [another forum (F2)], it is hard to see why F2
would be especially upset.... F2 could hardly quarrel with Fl's interpretation and applica-
tion of Fl's own law.").
165 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
166 See, e.g., Lidstrom, supra note 148 (identifying "the importance of English law as a
product of choice in key business sectors" as a motivating factor for parties' choice of
English law to govern their agreements).
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may not hesitate to choose, for example, New York law over the com-
mercial law of a European jurisdiction. 167
CONCLUSION
According to the ECJ, whatever benefit parties obtained from the
availability of antisuit relief from English courts is outweighed by the
need for uniformity among EU member states. West Tankers was thus
a necessary result for the legal stability of the European Union, and
antisuit injunctions have been sacrificed in the name of mutual trust
and effet utile.168 The actual effect of West Tankers on parties' choice of
a seat of arbitration remains to be seen, but judging from all of the
commentary generated by the Advocate General's opinion and the
ECJ decision, international arbitration counsel have noticed the po-
tential for a shift in the field. Thus far, commentators disagree about
the impact that West Tankers will have on parties' choice of a seat of
arbitration. 169 Most commentators have made general observations,
without regard to how West Tankers will affect specific types of parties.
With respect to the parties identified in Part III.A, however, from an
intuitive, cost-based analytical standpoint, the United States has be-
come a more attractive venue for arbitration.
Additionally, considering the attention that West Tankers has re-
ceived, the bark of the ECJ decision may end up having more impact
than its bite. It is not unimaginable that the reputational costs that
London may suffer as an arbitration venue will be larger than they
should be. Paradoxically, Lord Hoffmann's plea to the ECJ to pre-
serve the availability of antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration
agreements1 7 0 could actually do more harm than good to London's
167 See, e.g., Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 157, at 35-36 (enumerating steps that
New York State has taken to develop its commercial law and make itself attractive to parties
choosing a forum to litigate commercial disputes).
168 See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
169 Compare Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., English Court Anti-Suit Injunctions and the ECJ
Advocate-General's Opinion in West Tankers: The End of an Era?, Sept. 16, 2008, at 3, available
at http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/BRIEFINGEnglishCourtAntiSuitIn-
junction.pdf ("The more likely negative impact for parties considering London as a venue
for arbitration is the potential waste of time and costs in the event one party decides to
commence tactical proceedings in the courts of another EU Member State, in breach of
the arbitration agreement."), and Alex Spence, Lawyers Fear West Tankers Ruling Could
Harm London, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2009, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/busi-
ness/law/article5703346.ece ("London's position as a leading centre for high-value com-
mercial disputes was dealt a blow today by one of Europe's highest courts."), with Lidstrom,
supra note 148 ("The reasons for London's prominence as an arbitration venue are varied
and complex: the importance of English law as a product of choice in key business sectors;
the perceived quality of London-based counsel and arbitrators in those sectors; the empha-
sis (enshrined in the Arbitration Act 1996) on party autonomy; and the fact that London is
geographically accessible and cosmopolitan. None of these attractions is diminished by
the probable result in West Tankers.").
170 See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
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status as an arbitration venue. The opinion gives arbitration counsel
who argue that such equitable relief is important for parties wishing to
avoid parallel litigation ammunition to convince their clients that the
result of West Tankers is to make London a less arbitration-friendly
venue. Thus, in the manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy, parties may
choose jurisdictions that do offer antisuit relief not for substantive rea-
sons, but simply because of Lord Hoffmann's prediction that parties
would do so if the ECJ disallowed such relief.
Despite the lack of a clear standard in U.S. courts for the issuance
of an antisuit injunction to enforce an arbitration agreement, parties
can expend the resources necessary at the outset of their contractual
relationship to ensure that antisuit relief will be available by drafting
their arbitration agreements carefully. Presumably, if more parties
choose to seat their arbitration in the United States as a result of West
Tankers, U.S. courts will consider more petitions for antisuit relief.
Perhaps this will push courts, in the interest of judicial expediency, to
adopt a clearer standard to which parties can refer when crafting their
arbitration agreements.
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